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Urban fortunes and skeleton cityscapes: 
Real estate and late urbanization in Kigali and Addis Ababa 
Tom Goodfellow1 
 
ABSTRACT 
In many parts of Africa, societies that are still primarily rural are experiencing accelerated urban 
growth and highly visible booms in property development. Investment is pouring directly into what 
Lefebvre and Harvey characterizeGDVWKHµVHFRQGDU\FLUFXLW¶RIFDSLWDOLQWKHDEVHQce of significant 
industrialization. Debates about the drivers of investment in real estate are longstanding in relation to 
the global North, but have given little consideration to low-income and late-urbanising countries in 
Africa. Yet such contexts offer important opportunities to reflect on existing theory. Focusing on 
Kigali and Addis Ababa, which have transformed virtually beyond recognition in the past two 
decades, this article explores the drivers and consequences of investment in urban real estate in 
countries striving to structurally transform their economies. It argues that a range of formal and 
informal incentives and constraints have led to high-HQGUHDOHVWDWHEHLQJYLHZHGDVWKHµVDIHVWEHW¶IRU
those with resources to invest, even where demand is limited and governments are promoting other 
kinds of investment. While some people are reaping urban fortunes in largely untaxed rents, much of 
the construction is merely speculative, creating landscapes of unused and underused high-end 
properties in contexts where investment is desperately needed elsewhere. 
 
1. Introduction 
Eastern Africa is the last world region to undergo the urban transition. In no other region is 
there a cluster of adjacent countries with such low urbanization levels - particularly Burundi, 
Rwanda, Uganda, Ethiopia and South Sudan, all of which are still under 20% urbanized.2  
These societies are, however, currently experiencing accelerated urbanization and urban 
growth accompanied by highly visible booms in property development and construction. The 
notion that real estate should be both a driver and symbol of urban development seems 
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obvious today; yet little attention has been devoted to the dynamics of investment in urban 
land and property that are shaping urban transitions LQVRPHRIWKHZRUOG¶VSRRUHVWDQGOatest-
urbanising countries. At a time when visible (and especially vertical) physical transformation 
is often equated with modernization and development, these processes demand interrogation. 
Countries in Africa that comprise the µfinal frontier¶ of global urbanization and property 
development (Watson, 2014) constitute important sites in which to explore the limits and 
contemporary relevance of existing urban theory. The extensive literature on µODWH
GHYHORSPHQW¶, and what this means for FRXQWULHV¶ SRWHQWLDO WR HFRQRPLFDOO\ VSHFLDOize and 
prosper in a globalized world, has not been paralleled with adequate attention to the 
LPSOLFDWLRQV RI µODWH XUEDQization¶ LQ WKLV VDPH JOREDO FRQWH[W 7here is an urgent need to 
better understand the drivers and characteristics of urban property development in countries 
where real estate is a relatively new sector but is rapidly remaking cities with long-term 
implications.  
It is now widely known that urbanization and industrialization do not correlate in the 
contemporary global South as they did in the period of Northern industrialization (Fox, 2012; 
Gollin et al, 2016). Recent research shows that in many developing countries urbanization is 
characterized E\ WKH ULVH RI µFRQVXPSWLRQ FLWLHV¶ with different characteristics from 
µSURGXFWLRQ FLWLHV¶ While consumption cities are richer than production ones overall 
(particularly where consumption is driven by natural resource exports), they have higher slum 
populations and their relative wealth does not translate into improved wellbeing µto the same 
degree [as] an income boost through industrialization¶*ROOLQHWDO, 2016: 37).3 This may be 
partly because the service-based economic strategies that many late-developing countries are 
turning to, given that they are µUXQning out of industrLDOL]DWLRQ RSSRUWXQLWLHV¶ VRRQHU than 
their forebears (Rodrik, 2015: 24), do not µKDYHWKHFDSDFLW\WRDEVRUE± as manufacturing did 
± the type of labor that lowǦ and middleǦincome economies have in abundance¶ ibid: 24). 
Urbanization without industrialization thus raises important questions about the very nature 
of cities now and in the future.  
Having been debated for decades by urbanists working on the global North and some highly 
urbanized parts of the South, the pertinence of debates between Henri Lefebvre, David 
Harvey and Manuel Castells for poor but rapidly-urbanising parts of the world has been 
largely overlooked. Yet these contexts breathe new relevance into the debate. Lefebvre 
                                                          
3
 See also Obeng-Odoom (2014) on the effects of oil-driven urban development on inequality in the context of 
Ghana. 
3 
 
believed that after a certain point in history, urbanism itself µEHFRPHVDSURGXFWLYHIRUFHOLNH
VFLHQFH¶Lefebvre, 1970: 15), and that the city µLVDSODFHIRUFUHDWLRQDQGQRWVLPSO\DUHVXOW
WKH VLPSOH VSDWLDO HIIHFW RI D FUHDWLYH DFW WKDW RFFXUUHG HOVHZKHUH¶ LELG  The central 
critique levelled against him by Castells, and more sympathetically by Harvey, was that the 
urban was just the spatial embodiment of capitalist industrial development and therefore 
epiphenomenal to industrialization. This line, maintained over decades by Harvey, was 
persuasive with respect to the developed world and some large emerging economies such as 
the BRICS (Smith, 2003: xx). Yet it neglects to consider dynamics unfolding in some the 
latest-developing and fastest-urbanising parts of the world ± which are exactly those areas 
that Lefebvre¶V speculations in The Urban Revolution implicitly urge us to consider. 
Empirically, Lefebvre is being vindicated by developments in places such as Eastern and 
Central Africa where urbanization and urban property development have gathered pace in the 
virtual absence of industrial development, and are themselves shaping economies and 
societies.  
This article explores these issues by examining two African countries becoming well known 
for their ambitious developmental visions as well as their transforming urban skylines: 
Rwanda and Ethiopia. These countries are not yet developed enough to even be considered 
µHPHUJLQJ¶RUµIURQWLHU¶PDUNHWHFRQRPLHVLQWKHOLWHUDWXUHRQUHDOHVWDWH$EGXODLHWDO, 2015: 
4). They also fell with within the 5% of countries globally that had an urbanization level 
below 20% in 2011. In both cases, however, this is changing fast: according to UN figures, 
Rwanda KDG WKH ZRUOG¶V IDVWHVW XUEDQization rate from 2010-2015, with Ethiopia in joint 
seventh place (UNDESA, 2014).4 There is little by way of accompanying industrialization in 
either. Instead, much of the capital flowing into these countries, often in the form of 
international aid and remittances as neither has major natural resources to export, is 
coalescing around urban land and real estate: what Lefebvre, Harvey and others have termed 
WKHµVHFRQGDU\FLUFXLWRIFDSLWDO¶This is reflected in the fact that growth in real estate and 
construction significantly outstrips overall economic growth in both cases.5 Given the 
concerns raised by these theorists about over-reliance on this type of investment, and the 
questionable SURVSHFWVIRUHTXDOLW\DQGLQFOXVLRQLQµFRQVXPSWLRQFLWLHV¶*ROOLQVHWDO, 2016), 
it is important to understand what lies behind this headlong leap into WKHµVHFRQGDU\FLUFXLW¶  
                                                          
4
 Again, these figures are contested due to the paucity of data. 
5
 Various government datasets acquired in Rwanda and Ethiopia, 2014-15. 
4 
 
Rwanda and Ethiopia provide something of a natural experiment. In the former, real estate 
has been actively stimulated; in the latter, the reverse is true and property developers have 
had a troubled relationship with the state. This article explores how the real estate sector has 
been built DOPRVWµIURPVFUDWFK¶LQERWKFDVHV over the past two decades, given the legacy of 
the Rwandan genocide in 1994, and communism followed by civil war in Ethiopia pre-1991. 
In both capital cities, real estate has rapidly become a central pillar of the urban economy, 
albeit in rather GLIIHUHQW ZD\V , DUJXH WKDW GHVSLWH WKH (WKLRSLDQ JRYHUQPHQW¶V VWDWHG
objections to private real estate-led development and its commitment to manufacturing 
industry, informal incentives alongside obstacles to other investment render real estate 
equally if not even more magnetic than in Rwanda, where the government has encouraged it. 
This has important implications, suggesting a very powerful propensity under current global 
conditions for capital to coalesce specifically around high-end real estate even in low-income 
settings that urgently require more productive forms of investment.  
This article is based on interviews with stakeholders in Kigali and Addis Ababa from June 
2014-January 2015, including property developers, owners and renters, estate agents, 
government officials, international advisors, construction firms and architects. This is 
complemented by analysis of government documents and investment and taxation data. The 
article begins by exploring the relevance of theoretical debates on real estate investment for 
low-income countries today. This is followed by an overview of the structural origins of the 
property boom in both cities, leading into a discussion of the incentives and constraints (both 
formal and informal) in the real estate sector in each. We then turn to the outcomes of these 
incentive structures, which have produced substantial real estate investment (and wealth) in 
both cases. The character of investment differs in important ways between the two cities, yet 
in both is out of step with demand and highly problematic in terms of meeting the 
SRSXODWLRQV¶QHHGVERWKQRZDQGLQWKHIXWXUH)LQDOO\WKHarticle concludes with a discussion 
RIZK\SURSHUW\LQYHVWPHQWLVVHHQDVWKHµVDIHVWEHW¶UHIOHFWLQJRQWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVQRWRQO\
for these cities but broader understandings RIµODWHXUEDQization¶The article thus contributes 
to the broader literature on $IULFDQ µ6RXWKHUQ¶ DQG FRPSDUDWLYH XUEDQLVP 0\HUV 
Pieterse 2010; Robinson 2015; Roy 2011), as well as literature more specifically concerned 
with dynamics of real estate in African cities (Murray 2011; Obeng-Odoom 2015). 
 
2. The µVHFRQGDU\FLUFXLW¶RIFDSLWDODQG property development in Africa  
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The contemporary development of countries like Rwanda and Ethiopia poses a paradox with 
respect to Marxist urban theories. For Lefebvre, the flow of capital in to urban land and real 
estate was a symptom of advanced forms of urbanization: societies that have been through 
WKHµXUEDQUHYROXWLRQ¶, where cities no longer appear as islands µin a rural ocean¶ (Lefebvre, 
1970: 11). In such societies, µ5HDO HVWDWH IXQFWLRQV DV D VHFRQG VHFWRU D FLUFXLW WKDW UXQV
parallel to that of LQGXVWULDOSURGXFWLRQ>«@7KLVVHFRQGVHFWRUVHUYHVDVDEXIIHU,WLVZKHUH
capital flows in the event of a depression¶(ibid: 159). Harvey further developed these ideas, 
DUJXLQJ WKDWRYHUDFFXPXODWLRQ LQ WKHSULPDU\ LQGXVWULDO VHFWRU OHDGV WR WKH µVZLWFKLQJ¶RI
capital to the secondary sector (Harvey, 1978: 107). The paradox is that even though this 
advanced industrial urbanization has not been reached in societies such as Ethiopia and 
Rwanda, where most people are still rural farmers, capital is rapidly coalescing around urban 
land and real estate as if they were advanced urban societies.  
Globalization is clearly relevant here; the flow of capital straight into the secondary circuit in 
the South is predicated on a history of industrial growth in the North and can be linked to 
ZKDW +DUYH\  WHUPV WKH µVSDWLDO IL[¶ ZKHUHE\ RYHU-accumulated capital seeks new 
geographical terrain. Lefebvre, meanwhile, was SUHVFLHQW HQRXJK WR QRWH WKDW µIt can even 
happen that real-estate speculation becomes the principal source for the formation of 
FDSLWDO«7KH VHFRQG FLUFXLW VXSSODQWV WKH ILUVW EHFRPHV HVVHQWLDO¶ Lefebvre, 1970: 160). 
What he may not have considered is that cities which were VWLOOHIIHFWLYHO\µLVODQGVLQDUXUDO
RFHDQ¶ PLJKW EHFRPH IRFDO SRLQWV IRU UHDO HVWDWH LQYHVWPHQW DV FDSLWDO µKRSV¶ UDWKHU WKDQ
flows into strategic sites in less-developed parts of Africa (Ferguson, 2006). Moreover, as 
global growth slows in the contemporary setting, returns on capital are likely to further 
increase (Piketty, 2014) and developing country cities offer interesting opportunities for those 
µZKRDUHORRNLQJWRDGGVRPHULVNWRWKHLUSRUWIROLRV¶GXHWRWKHSRWHQWLDOUHZDUGVWKDWVXFK
risky investments offer (Abdulai et al, 2015: 3). ,Q WKLVFRQWH[W µJHRJUDSKLFDOVZLWFKLQJ¶DV
ZHOODVµVHFWRUDOVZLWFKLQJ¶LVOLNHO\WRLQFUHDVH.XW] 
The specificity of cities experiencing major real estate development without a backdrop of 
industrial urbanism nevertheless poses challenges for dominant paradigms in urban studies. 
Much late twentieth-century urban theory is predicated on assumptions about the shift from 
industrial to postindustrial cities, and how the latter have both been shaped by and destroyed 
the former. The spectre of an industrial past is hardwired into much urban theory. More 
recently, scholars have however questioned Harvey and Lefebvre¶V DVVXPSWLRQ WKDW
investment in the secondary circuit is necessarily linked to crises and overaccumulation in the 
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primary circuit (Aalbers, 2007; Charney, 2001; Gotham, 2006). These authors instead see the 
UHDO HVWDWH VHFWRU DV µD FRQFHSWXDOO\ VHSDUDWH DQG DQDO\WLFDOO\ GLVWLQFW FLUFXLW RI FDSLWDO
LQYHVWPHQW¶ *RWKDP, 2009: 359). Aalbers notes that the flow of capital into the secondary 
FLUFXLW LV QRW RQO\ D FRQVHTXHQFH RI HFRQRPLF FULVLV EXW µSDUWO\ D Vign of the intrinsic 
RSSRUWXQLWLHVWKDWWKHEXLOWHQYLURQPHQWSURYLGHV¶$DOEHUV, 2007: 174). It has intrinsic appeal 
because it can be a superior hedge against inflation, diversifies investment portfolios away 
from stocks and bonds, and offers greater tax benefits compared to other kinds of investments 
(Charney, 2001: 742).  
In most developing countries this relative appeal is even greater, for both foreign and 
domestic investors alike. As well as the difficulty of making the primary sector profitable 
(Rodrik, 2015), inflation rates tend to be high, while stock and bond investment options are 
limited or non-existent. TKXVUHFHQWUHVHDUFKLQ8JDQGDKDVVKRZQWKDWµLQVWHDGRIGHSRVLWLQJ
money in bank accounts or investing in instruments such as shares and bonds, most 
LQGLYLGXDOV LQYHVW LQSK\VLFDOVWUXFWXUHVVXFKDV ODQGDQGEXLOGLQJV¶.DQJDYHHWDO, 2016). 
Evidence suggests this investment is disproportionate to the use value of such structures 
(ibid). Moreover, as will be explored below, tax benefits also play a significant role - though 
less through formal tax incentives than through the weak capacity of existing taxation 
systems. There are thus reasons to consider an intrinsic link between conditions of late 
development and the enhanced pull of the secondary circuit, though this is rarely explicitly 
examined in the literature.  
The global North focus of mainstream property development literature also involves 
assumptions about the availability of information on real estate values and transactions that 
do not travel well (see for example Archer and Ling, 1997). ,Q WKH OLWHUDWXUH RQ µSURSHUW\
PDUNHWPDWXULW\¶, HYHQPDUNHWV LQ ,WDO\DQG6SDLQDUHFRQVLGHUHGµLPPDWXUH¶RU µHPHUJLQJ¶
E\FRQYHQWLRQDOFULWHULD.HRJKDQG'¶DUF\, 1994). Yet the very foundations on which these 
criteria are based are of limited relevance in low-income countries with extremely nascent 
real estate sectors, where most property transactions are unregistered and construction often 
informal (Kusiluka, 2012). Most property research involves taxonomies of agents with clear-
cut roles such as landowner, speculator, investor, developer, valuer and so on, and established 
systems of interaction between them (Haila, 1991). These institutionalized networks of actors 
are often absent or highly underdeveloped in late-urbanising low-income countries. This is 
not to say that agency is insignificant. As HOVHZKHUH WKH LQWHUDFWLRQ EHWZHHQ DJHQWV¶
strategies and structural incentives is crucial to understanding urban property dynamics 
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(Healey and Barrett, 1990; Gottdiener, 1994; Soares de Magalhãs, 1999). Exploring 
contextual variables that influence property investment in these places is crucial; as 
%HDXUHJDUGKDVSRLQWHGRXWPDUNHWORJLFLVµWKLQ¶EXWSURSHUW\GHYHORSPHQWLWVHOILV
µWKLFN¶- concrete, textured and place-specific. An important general point is that in late-
urbanizing countries with nascent property sectors, the roles of agents may be blurred and 
property relationships characterized to a significant degree by informal, socially-embedded 
brokerage (Obeng-Odoom, 2015).  
The sphere of urban property development is thus guided by a different range of institutions 
DQG µSODFH HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ 0RORWFK, 1993) in contexts where the urban institutional 
environment is relatively highly informalized (Simone, 2004; Roy, 2011; Kusiluka, 2012; 
Obeng-Odoom, 2015). The shaping of urban fortunes everywhere is crucially affected by 
government regulations and institutions (Logan and Molotch, 2007). Yet in low-income, late-
urbanising countries with relatively weak state implementation capabilities, it may not be the 
formal regulations themselves but the very fact that they are weak and compromised that 
most shapes the investment environment. Investors can therefore realize VXEVWDQWLDOSURILWVµLQ
places that have weak or non-existent state requirements for developers to contribute to 
infrastructure costs or to share in the land value increases resulting from real estate 
GHYHORSPHQW¶3DOPHUDQG%HUULVIRUG, 2015: 5). Under current global conditions, real estate 
can thus become especially appealing in places where economic growth is creating new 
property markets, yet the institutions that might share the benefits of property investments 
(and thereby make them less profitable) are still weak. This is what makes tax such a 
significant consideration. Thus in a country like Myanmar, opening suddenly to international 
capital, property prices are soaring such that µDQ\RQHZLWKWKHIXQGVWRGRVRLVLQYHVWLQJLQ
UHDOHVWDWH¶DQGWKHJRYHUQPHQWLVQRZFRQVLGHULQJDUDQJHRISURSHUW\-related taxes for fear 
of the impact of this on other forms of saving and investment.6  
The supposed incentive effects of particular property-related taxes have been extensively 
theorized by economists regarding their possible effects on the efficiency of land use and 
decisions about where to locate buildings (Bahl and Linn, 1992; Netzer, 2003). However, the 
broader question of how property taxes or their absence might affect the overall pattern of 
investment, and decisions to invest in property vis-à-vis other sectors, is largely overlooked. 
There is nevertheless reason to believe (as the government of Myanmar evidently does) that 
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the presence or absence of effective property taxation plays a role in the overall incentive 
structure for investment. So too do many other factors beyond the official policies 
specifically intended to guide investment in particular strategic directions. In order to 
understand why investment is concentrating so intensely on urban real estate in Rwanda and 
Ethiopia, but also why this investment takes different forms in each, close attention needs to 
be paid to the informal as well as formal incentive structures and how these interact with the 
practices of agents involved in creating real estate. 
 
3. Building a real estate sector from scratch  
Beginning with Rwanda, this section briefly discusses the background to the property boom 
and how it relates to the current context for real estate development. The extent of the 
devastation, rapid inflow of international resources and various waves of refugee influx after 
1994 are critical to understanding the investment context in Kigali.7 In the last few years of 
WKH PLOOHQQLXP .LJDOL¶V SRSXODWLRQ JUHZ DW DQ DVWRQLVKLQJ  SHU \HDU DV PLOOLRQV RI
returnees poured into the city and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) consolidated security in 
the city (Goodfellow and Smith, 2013). Large amounts of foreign aid were disbursed, on top 
of $2bn debt cancellation in 2002.8 Meanwhile, a new generation of (often foreign-born) 
Rwandans were becoming increasingly interested in owning their own home, and in a 
decimated economy the channelling of resources into the built environment was initially an 
LQHYLWDEOHRXWFRPH7KHUHZDVµDJJUHVVLYH LQIUDVWUXFWXUHUROORXW¶E\ the state, supported by 
GRQRUIXQGVµRSHQLQJQHZDUHDVRIWKHFLW\IRUGHYHORSPHQW¶.9  
At this time, it is important to note that there was virtually nothing by way of a property 
development sector to speak of; the only agencies that engaged in real estate development at 
scale by 2005 were one state-owned enterprise and the Rwanda Social Security Fund 
(discussed further below). For the most part, houses were developed by individuals who 
FRQWUDFWHG VPDOO ILUPV 7KLV LQFOXGHG D VLJQLILFDQW QXPEHU RI µKLJK-HQG¶ UHVLGHQWLDO
properties, financed by elites, which were usually built to be rented out. In the context of 
heightened international donor and NGO presence, by the mid-2000s there was a booming 
rental real estate market largely driven by international personnel. Much of this was in the 
µQHZDUHDV¶RIWKHFLW\RSHQLQJXSRQWKHnorth and northeast urban periphery. 
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Addis Ababa has a distinctive history due Ethiopia¶V KLVWRU\ RI imperial (rather than 
European colonial) rule until 1974. A real estate market of sorts operated under the Emperors, 
whereby dignitaries possessing large land concessions gradually sold parts of these off to the 
growing administrative and commercial classes, who in turn constructed at the back of their 
lots to offer buildings for rent to new urban dwellers (Duroyaume, 2015: 398). Hence the city 
became characterizeG E\ DQ XQXVXDO SDWWHUQ RI µVXPSWXRXV GZHOOLQJV DORQJVLGH KRYHOV RI
ZDWWOH DQG GDXE¶ LELG  7KLV UHDO HVWDWH PDUNHW ZDV KRZHYHU HIIHFWLYHO\ terminated 
when the communist Derg regime took power in 1974. As well as all land, most housing was 
nationalizeGDQGWKHLPSHULDOXUEDQVWUXFWXUHZDVµIUR]HQ¶,ELG2QRYHUWKURZLQJWKH
Derg in 1991, the Ethiopian PHRSOH¶V5HYROXWLRQDU\'HPRFUDWLF)URQW(35')government 
was initially uninterested in cities. Existing housing was neglected and as the state retained 
land ownership there was no formal property market to speak of. In the 2000s, however, this 
began to change as economic growth accelerated and home ownership became an important 
objective of the government.  
As the EPRDF developed its land leasing policy, initiated in 1993 but altered over time (see 
Adam, 2014), private property developers came to play an increasing role. In the early 2000s, 
loans were made available for the purposes of real estate development, as was cheap land.10 
Ayat Real Estate was the first firm to offer suburban villa complexes in the Eastern suburbs 
of Addis, sold at prices accessible to the upper-middle classes. Other firms followed suit. 
Meanwhile, being the focal city for the African Union and other international agencies, Addis 
$EDED¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO community grew to sizeable proportions, necessitating both office 
space in central areas and higher-end housing in the new suburbs. New forms of 
socioeconomic segregation thus began to emerge that werHQRWW\SLFDOLQ(WKLRSLD¶VKLVWRU\
Finally, the role of the diaspora has been crucial(WKLRSLD¶VGLDVSRUDFRQVWLWXWHVDQ estimated 
1.5-2 million people, mostly living in the USA, who provide an estimated gross annual 
income of $20bn to the country (Lefort, 2015: 368).  After the 2008 financial crisis, diaspora 
were even more likely to invest in property development µEDFN KRPH¶ in the Ethiopian 
capital.11 
Despite these important driving factors in the wake of conflict and post-socialist transition, 
there are clear reasons to believe that property development has taken on dynamics in both 
countries that are divorced from the level and structure of demand. As demonstrated below, 
                                                          
10
 Interview, 30 September 2014. 
11
 Interview, 29 September 2014. 
10 
 
the incentive structures in place in both countries have (whether intentionally or not) led to 
real estate absorbing a disproportionate amount of resources in both cities, to the detriment of 
other possibilities for productive investment.  
 
4. Incentives for (and constraints to) property development  
Rwanda has various formal incentives pertaining to real estate and construction, in line with 
the prioritisation of urban infrastructure development in its Vision 2020 strategy, which also 
sets out the objective of being 35% urbanized by 2020. One way in which investment in real 
estate and infrastructure have been encouraged is through generous incentives in the 
construction sector, including a flat tax of just 5% levied on the import of building and 
finishing materials for projects worth at least $1.8m.12 The Kigali City government has also 
made FRQFHUWHGHIIRUWVWRHQFRXUDJHWKHVHFWRUSDUWLFXODUO\VLQFHWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDµ2QH
6WRS &HQWUH¶ IRU ZRXOG-be property investors in 2010. This centre, inspired by Singapore, 
aims to ensure that investors in large real estate projects acquire all necessary documentation 
within 30 days.13  
Meanwhile, the Rwandan Development Bank has a mandate to facilitate financial tools for 
real estate development (RoR, 2015a) and several banks now offer commercial mortgage 
schemes. These are accessible to only a small minority of the population; an estimated 19% 
RI.LJDOL¶VSRSXODWLRQ HDUQHQRXJK WR DFFHVV D PRUWJDJHZKLOH in Rwanda as a whole the 
SHUFHQWDJH LV µXQNQRZQEXW IDU ORZHU¶ 5R5, 2015b: 18). Nevertheless, for those who can, 
mortgages have become popular both with people seeking to build their own houses or 
acquire existing ones. Up to 70% of the loans made by some banks are mortgages.14 For 
many among the upper and middle classes, accessing mortgages is much easier than other 
routes to finance, creating incentives to invest in building additional houses for rental. As one 
civil servant pointed out: µ, LQYHVWHG LQ KRXVLQJ EHFDXVH , KDG IHZ RStions. I can access a 
mortgage, EXWQRWDORDQ¶15 
Alongside these various measures to stimulate the sector, the government has been directly 
involved in real estate development through the Rwanda Social Security Board (RSSB), 
which has a strategic aim of investing 25% of its funds in property. To date, however, this has 
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been extremely high-end. Most striking of all is the current mega-SURMHFW µ9LVLRQ &LW\¶
(reputedly the largest real estate project in East Africa) which involves 500 variable-sized 
units, none of which can be considered anything but luxurious in the Rwandan context. The 
most expensive units are due to sell for $560,000, with some slightly more modest ones at 
$370,000. The project, which builds on some smaller RSSB-funded real estate projects 
ostensibly aimed DWµPLGGOHLQFRPH¶JURXSVEXWonly affordable to the rich, was viewed with 
almost universal scepticism by all non-RSSB stakeholders consulted. For the RPF-led 
government, however, the intention is for RSSB to lead the way in positioning Kigali as a 
prime site for real estate development,QWKHZRUGVRIDQ566%UHSUHVHQWDWLYHµ9LVLRQFLW\LV
intended as a landmark ± to provide an inspiration, a model to stimulate more high-quality 
UHDO HVWDWH LQYHVWPHQW¶16 As with many other cities worldwide, the influence of specific 
economic and aesthetic conceptions of the µJOREDOFLWy¶DUHclearly discernible in this project. 
Arguably even more important than these formal efforts to incentivize and µinspire¶ real 
estate are other policies and practices which act as informal incentives to build. Among the 
most significant are those relating to property-related taxation. Particularly important here is 
the situation regarding rental income tax. In a very unusual move, the Rwandan government 
decided in 2001 that rather than taxing rental incomes through the Rwanda Revenue 
Authority (RRA), rental income tax would be decentralized to districts, leaving the RRA to 
concentrate on business incomes. 7KLV VKRFNHG REVHUYHUV JLYHQ WKDW 5ZDQGD¶V GLVWULFW
governments were severely lacking in institutional and technical capacity to collect such 
taxes. The tax was subsequently re-centralized in 2014. However, given the lack of district 
capacity, this created a thirteen-year window of opportunity DW D FUXFLDO WLPH LQ 5ZDQGD¶V
development for people to reap rewards from soaring and largely untaxed rents. In many 
cases, property rentals (as well as sales) take place through informal brokers and middlemen, 
IRUPVRI µSODFHHQWUHSUHQHXU¶ WKDWKDYH LQHYLWDEO\ IORXULVKHGJLYHQ WKHSURILWV LQ WKHVHFWRU
but which further exacerbate the opacity of property transactions, rendering taxation 
extremely challenging.17 By 2010, a donor report noted that µWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWVLQJOHVRXUFH
of untapped revenues in the country is rental incomes from ownership of urban commercial 
DQG UHVLGHQWLDO SURSHUW\ DERYH DOO LQ .LJDOL¶ (DFID, 2010). It is doubtful that the rush to 
build so many high-end properties would have been so intense if those rents were taxed by 
the relatively effective RRA, rather than left virtually untouched at local level. 
                                                          
16
 Interview, 3 June 2014 
17
 Interview, 5 June 2014 
12 
 
In addition, the existing system of µIL[HGDVVHW¶ property) taxation itself is incredibly weak 
(see Goodfellow, 2015), reinforcing the appeal of developing high-end property. Many 
people are not even aware of property tax, and it barely figures in the thinking of the 
Rwandan Development Board.18 Despite the kinds of rational-choice based theorising 
discussed by Bahl and Linn (1992), is difficult to predict the effect a tax would have on the 
property market in practice. When asked about the possible impacts of more effective 
property taxation, most sources involved in real estate believed it would have a significant 
impact of some kind. In terms of the lucrative rental market (discussed below), some 
observed that the tax would likely lead rents to increase, thus pushing renters down into less 
valuable properties and creating a squeeze on the housing market.19 It µmight affect the 
LQFHQWLYHVIRUSHRSOHWRFRQVWUXFWDWDOODVWKHUHDUHVRPDQ\FRVWV¶20 An alternative potential 
ramification, which one developer described as µREYLRXV¶ in the Rwandan context, was that 
developers would KDYHWRVWDUWEXLOGLQJDWDµORZHUVWDQGDUG¶21 How this would affect rents 
(and housing affordability) is difficult to say in the abstract, because it would depend on the 
profit margins developers are willing to accept and the structure of demand. Unless a more 
effective and progressive property tax system is developed, one can only speculate on its 
potential effects; yet the continuing absence of such taxation is another clear manifestation of 
the lack of disincentives to invest in high-end real estate, even if that is not where capital 
investments are most needed.  
Despite all these factors incentivising real estate investment, there are enormous constraints 
to construction in Rwanda. Materials are very expensive (with 60% imported from abroad). 
Moreover, despite the nascent mortgage market, access to finance is highly constrained as 
interest rates are so high. One developer described having µVWDFNVRIODQGDOODURXQG.LJDOL¶
but not being able to use much of it due to the prohibitive 18-20% interest rates.22 The huge 
costs faced by developers mean that they expect very high profit margins; at least 20-40%.23 
Ironically, the costs of construction further push people towards the high end of the market, 
where serious profits are most likely. 7KH SULFH RI µSUHPLXP¶ SURSHUW\ is determined by 
location, taste and style as well as construction cost, and the renters being targeted are often 
not paying from their pockets but through the generous allowances of international 
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organizations. In a new market such as Rwanda, this often means that the higher that 
developers go in terms of producing properties perceived as high-end DQG µinternational 
standard¶, the greater the potential profit. $VRQHDUFKLWHFWREVHUYHGµWKHRQO\ZD\\RXFDQ
battle the huge cost of finance is to build more expensively.¶24 Meanwhile, the fact that 81% 
of the population do not earn enough to be able to access any kind of mortgage means there is 
no effective demand from low and middle-income groups to incentivize developers to build 
for them. The constraints to property development and the incentives to construct high-end 
properties are thus two sides of the same coin.  
In marked contrast to Rwanda, there are no formal incentives for real estate developers in 
Ethiopia. As noted above, at first the government provided cheap land, but following 
increased commitment to prioritize other sectors (alongside concerns about corruption and 
speculation in real estate) this is no longer the case.25 The government is suspicious of service 
sectors generally, and views them as having rent-seeking rather than value-creating 
tendencies.26 A series of events, including one particularly high-profile scandal involving the 
firm Access Real Estate, heightened distrust between developers and the government from 
the late 2000s. A regime that was already suspicious of the sector thus became actively 
hostile, especially towards those who, like Access, aiPWRVHOOSURSHUWLHVµRIISODQ¶WDNLQJa 
large percentage of payment before they have actually been constructed. This lack of trust 
and the policies it generated have had some unintended consequences. One of these is that 
people are so distrustful of developers that they are desperate for their own land, contributing 
to a scramble that has pushed up land prices and  made the production of housing even more 
expensive.27 Partly due to the Access scandal, a series of complex policies from around 2010 
aimed to prevent land speculation. These introduced a limited six-month window during 
which individuals who have acquired land are allowed to sell it on undeveloped. Thereafter, 
for residential properties you have to have built 50% of the structure outlined in your 
approved plans, or 30% for commercial property, before you are allowed to pass on the title 
deed.28 Moreover, if developers want to subdivide land into individual parcels then they have 
to have developed 70% of the structure before they can acquire individual title deeds.29  
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Despite the more hostile formal institutional environment, as in Kigali there are numerous 
powerful informal incentives to invest in property. Inflation plays a role; in the words of one 
source, µLI\RX¶UHDZHDOWK\(WKLRSLDQZKDt do you do with your money? You get 5% at the 
bank but inflation is 10-¶.30 There is also no stock market ± Ethiopia is the ZRUOG¶V
largest country in population terms not to have a stock exchange. Meanwhile, as in Kigali, 
property tax is virtually non-existent (Goodfellow, 2015).  On top of this (and contrasting 
somewhat with Kigali), despite the above measures to prevent land speculation, the planning 
and construction regulations themselves are relatively lax. Building permits are required, but 
the system of occupation permits (whereby your construction has to be approved for use after 
being constructed) is barely functional,31 removing a further barrier to the use of property as a 
relatively easy source of economic returns. 
Alongside these unintended incentives to invest in buildings, there are enormous constraints. 
There is no mortgage system, and in a banking system tightly controlled by the state it is very 
difficult for developers to get loans. The state-owned banks prioritize loans for national 
development priorities, such as the textile and leather industries. Moreover, private banks are 
constrained because for every $1 they lend, they are obliged to put 27 cents into purchasing 
bonds from the national development bank to help fund EthLRSLD¶V IODJVKLSHQHUJ\SURMHFW
the National Renaissance Dam.32 This discourages banks from giving long-term commercial 
loans, as they need to retain sufficient capital to purchase these bonds. In addition, real estate 
developers are only able to get loans from commercial banks if they have title deeds for 
individual plots, which as noted above requires them to have already developed 70% of the 
property.33  
Further constraining development is the fact that land is extremely expensive, as the 
government releases limited amounts of land for leasehold sale, and for commercial projects 
this is mostly allocated through competitive bidding. Construction costs are inflated by lack 
of infrastructure, transport costs and delays caused by anti-corruption measures.34 In the 
absence of mortgagesDQGZLWKQHZFRQVWUDLQWVRQGHYHORSHUV¶FDSDFLW\WRVHOOSURSHUWLHVµRII
SODQ¶ WKH PDMRULW\ RI SURSHUW\ GHYHORSPHQW QRZ FRPHV HLWKHU in the form of mega-
investments by investors with enough upfront cash (including the state itself), and 
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incremental building by individuals and organizations as they acquire money gradually.  The 
diaspora fall into both categories, and for disapora the incentive to invest in property is 
augmented by the fact that they are prohibited from investing in key sectors exclusively 
reserved for domestic Ethiopians: insurance, banking, telecommunications, media and air 
transport services. 
The constraints on the property market and the lure of investing in real estate are again two 
sides of the same coin. Indeed, the additional squeeze on the sector after the Access scandal 
ZDVGHVFULEHGE\RQHILUPDVµERWKDSUREOHPDQGDQRSSRUWXQLW\¶EHFDXVHQRZLI\RXILQLVK
the job (rather than selling off plan) people will pay much more.35 There is sufficient demand 
from (WKLRSLD¶VZHDOWK\HOLWHs for properties to either live in or rent out that any developer 
who can deliver the finished product is well placed to make astonishing profits.36 It is to the 
urban outcomes of the incentive structures discussed here, and the income generation linked 
to them, that we now turn. 
 
5. Urban fortunes and skeleton cityscapes 
Returning again to Kigali, the effect of the incentives discussed above on the high-end 
residential property market is palpable, particularly in terms of rental properties. Rentals 
dominate the business of the small number of formal estate agents. Few if any houses are 
available to rent below $500 per month, and this would only obtain a cheap apartment far 
from the city centre. Very top-end properties rent for $8,000-$10,000 per month, and most 
estate agents reportedly have properties that even go up to $12,000. More commonly, houses 
LQµQHZ¶DUHDVRIWKHFLW\UHQWIRUDURXQGWKRXJKDURXQGZRXOGEHµW\SLFDO¶IRU
someone working for the EU or a foreign embassy.37 Clearly, in a country with an annual 
GDP per capita in current USD of $697,38 µQRWPDQ\5ZDQGHVHDUHUHQWing those houses at 
WKRVHSULFHV¶39 
Insert Figure 1 here 
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Caption: Prime residential real estate in Kigali at various stages of construction (Photo by the 
author) 
 
Given the limitations of property-related taxation, the rental income accruing to owners of 
these properties is very substantial, further incentivising the construction of houses at the top 
end of the market both by individuals and SURSHUW\GHYHORSPHQWFRPSDQLHV7KXVµDOOILUPV
DUHILJKWLQJIRURIWKHPDUNHW¶ZKHQRIWKHGHPDQGLVIRUORZ-income housing.40 
The RSSB projects are exacerbating the problem, and ultimately serve to make the rich 
richer. Rwanda is the most unequal country in the East African region, and among the top 
10% most unequal countries in the world by Gini coefficient;41 these real estate dynamic can 
have done little to alleviate this. One source linked to RSSB itself claimed that most people 
who were able to buy houses in their projects already own other houses, so they just rent 
them out.42 Some observers lament that WKH DFWRUV LQ WKH UHDO HVWDWH VHFWRU DUH µcreating a 
EXEEOH:HKDYHWRRPXFKRIILFHVSDFHWRRPDQ\KRWHOVDQGWRRPXFKµKLJKHQG¶43 Indeed, 
in the commercial real estate sector some sources claim that µPRVWRIILFHEORFNVDUHHPSW\¶44  
and that despite the apparent scramble to build more, commercial areaVDUHµIDLOLQJ¶45 
By 2014, it was apparent that the bubble had already started to burst and rents were falling 
due to an oversupply of high-end housing. One source noted that µ\RX FDQ¶W UHDOO\ FKDUJH
$4,000 anymore WKRXJK ODQGORUGV VWLOO ZDQW WR¶.46 Meanwhile, although most high-end 
houses were built for rental, µPDQ\ RI WKHP HQG XS RQ VDOH DV [the owners] FDQ¶W JHW WKH
UHQW¶47 Others likewise note that µPany people have failed to get tenants. My rents have 
dropped from $1500 to $1000¶48 While the rental market was considered stable in 2011, 
continued supply at the high end combined with international aid cuts and budget cuts meant 
that by 2014 there waVµOHVVDSSHWLWHIRUKXPXQJRXVYLOODV¶.49 Meanwhile, prospective renters 
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of luxury properties can bargain down with relative ease, for example from $8,000 to 
$6,000.50  
Despite this, aFWRUVLQ WKHVHFWRUQRWHGWKDWµ7KHVHGD\V«SHRSOHDOVRZDQWDELWRI ILQHVVH¶
DQGµ\RXKDYHWRXS\RXUJDPHWRGD\¶LQWHUPVRITXDOLW\IL[WXUHVDQGILWWLQJV&RQVHTXHQWO\
while profit margins may be dropping, there is still an ongoing effort to create properties that 
appeal to the high income group in terms of quality relative to existing properties. Because 
the effective demand from the low-income majority of the population is so constrained, 
developers continue to build at the high end in the hope of future rental and sale profits ± and 
with little by way of tax disincentives to steer their investment decisions elsewhere. 
Moreover, while rents may be dipping, anyone who has channelled great sums into property 
is unlikely to lower the price very substantially, so prices remain far beyond the reach of the 
majority. $ EXEEOH HFRQRP\ VHUYLQJ D WLQ\ IUDFWLRQ RI WKH FRXQWU\¶V SURSHUW\ QHHGV
promoted by the circulation of a certain number of international personnel and the growing 
wealth of a small economic elite, thus prevails.  
The one major institutional investor, RSSB, is meanwhile continuing to build houses that are 
clearly unaffordable even to relatively well-off civil servants, which is ironic as they are the 
ones paying into the pension scheme. The disconnect is striking: as one such civil servant 
rhetorically asked, µDP ,EX\LQJDKRXVHLQ1HZ<RUN"¶.51  RSSB representatives suggest the 
houses are aimed at diaspora. Against this, a source with close knowledge of diaspora profiles 
claimed µZHGRQ¶WKDYHDGLDVSRUDWKDWULFK7KH\GRQ¶WNQRZZKRRXUGLDVSRUDDUH¶52 
In stark contrast to Kigali, those involved in real estate in Addis believe that there is an 
enormous amount of unmet demand for residential housing even at the high end, due to the 
extreme constraints discussed above. One claimed that there is currently unmet demand for 
50,000 housing units in the $300,000-$400,000 range. All of the real estate companies 
together only build an estimated 1,000-1,500 per year, so this demand is nowhere near being 
met.53 Unlike in Kigali, the (much larger) diaspora undoubtedly do play a critical role here. 
One property developer DIILUPHG WKDW µ RI RXU EX\HUV DUH (WKLRSLDQV OLYLQJ LQ foreign 
FRXQWULHV XVXDOO\ WKH86¶54 The ongoing demand for high-end residential property is thus 
much higher in Addis both because there is a much larger wealthy diaspora looking to own 
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homes in the city and because the squeeze on developers means that supply is more 
constrained.  
All of this means that relative to other sectors, real estate is extremely profitable for those 
who have the finance to engage in development. It is perfectly feasible to make 100% profit 
on the construction and sale of a house.55  Finished houses can also command twice or more 
the price of similar KRXVHVVROGµRIISODQ¶56 Undersupply is such that the first houses built by 
Ayat around the turn of the millennium, which at the time sold for ETB 187,000, were in 
2014 being sold on for ETB 4m, with no improvement ± in other words their value increased 
over twentyfold in under 15 years.57  Other developers said that houses that sold for ETB 3m 
in 2009 were worth 12m in 2014.58 Those who purchase houses from developers and sell 
them on relatively soon are thus able to make enormous profits.  Meanwhile, people lucky 
enough to be allocated (by lottery) an apartment through WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V FRQGRPLQLXP
programme59 can also either gain a very good income through rent 60 or sell the apartment on 
(after 5-year period during which selling is prohibited) at a profit. While the purpose of the 
condominium programme was to house low-income communities, the ability to sell the units 
has led to sale prices of around ETB 1.5m (around $70,000) and rising for an apartment, 
which is far beyond the capacity of low and even most middle-income groups to purchase, 
especially in the absence of mortgages.61 $WSHUDQQXP(WKLRSLD¶V*'3SHUFDSLWD LV
YHU\VLPLODUWR5ZDQGD¶V62  
Another striking feature of Addis $EDED¶VHPHUJLQJODQGVFDSHZKLFKGZDUIVWKDWRFFXUULQJ
in Kigali, is the extent of commercial real estate development and in particular the 
mushrooming of high-rise towers. The fact that construction is second only to government as 
an employer in Addis Ababa63 cannot be adequately grasped without considering the scale of 
commercial real estate development being undertaken in the city. Opinions differ on the 
actual extent of demand for commercial property. The presence of a large number of 
international organizationVLQDFLW\WKDWIXOILOVWKHUROHRIWKHGLSORPDWLFµFDSLWDORI$IULFD¶LV
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clearly significant in accounting for the explosion of commercial development. Yet there is 
also speculation on the perceived potential for future profits in commercial real estate, and 
again the lack of any tax disincentive for unused or under-utilized commercial structures is 
important here. Indeed, WKRVHZKRRZQODQGDUHRIWHQNHHQWRµJDPEOHRQWKHVWURQJGHPDQG
IRURIILFHDQGFRPPHUFLDOVSDFH¶by constructing, rather than sell it or use it in any other way 
(Duroyaume, 2015: 405).  
 
Insert Figure 2 here 
Caption: Unfinished commercial structures in Addis Ababa (Photo by the author) 
 
For diaspora, who are prohibited from investing in several key sectors open to other 
Ethiopians, building office or retail space for rent is especially appealing. This is one group 
that does have much easier access to finance. Since 2005, when Ethiopia turned towards a 
more market-driven growth model, the opportunity to engage in major real estate ventures 
relatively unhindered by tax helped to keep the potentially hostile diaspora (many of whom 
do not support the ruling regime) content. The deal between the government and the 
FRXQWU\¶VµQHZHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶PDQ\of whom were diaspora, was implicit: µstop politicking 
DQGZH¶OOKHOS\RXJHWULFK¶/HIRUW, 2015: 365). It is clear which option most diaspora have 
picked in their pursuit of enrichment; despite numerous formal government incentives to 
invest in industry and none for real estate, the reality is that many diaspora have become de 
IDFWRµSODFHHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶LQWKHFLW\60% of all investment by diaspora in the period 1994-
2014 was in real estate and related services, which was four times more than the amount they 
invested in manufacturing; and 91% of all diaspora investment was located in Addis Ababa.64 
It therefore comes as little surprise that even in Ethiopia, where the government has 
concertedly pursued a strategy of industrialization, manufacturing still constitutes barely 5% 
of GDP (Lefort, 2015: 369).  
A significant degree of informality characterises such property investments, and the channels 
through which these resources travel to fund the escalating landscape are difficult to 
establish. As RQHVRXUFHQRWHGµWhe question we are all asking is: where is all the money for 
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cRQVWUXFWLRQFRPLQJIURP"¶65 One study by a local research organization reportedly showed 
that just 10-15% of the money ploughed into construction in a five-year period had passed 
through banks.66 What is clear is that the current incentive structure, and consequent 
behaviour of those who invest in and develop property, lead to a very large number of 
incomplete structures. This is partly because of the perceived appeal of real estate as a source 
of profit for anyone able to get involved, even those without the expertise or capacity to 
finish the job. These are often not property developers in the sense assumed in the 
conventional real estate literature. One construction engineer noted that many people in other 
businesses, with no knowledge whatsoever of the sector, effectively become entrepreneurs in 
unfinished places: they µVHH WKDW LW¶V VR OXFUDWLYHVR WU\ WR LQYHVW their profits in real estate. 
When they run out of funds they re-invest what they have in their [other] business, hoping to 
make more profit to finish the job, but this rarely happens.¶67  
Further feeding this are the aforementioned rules regarding how much must be built on a plot 
of land before title deeds can be transferred, which creates incentives to part-construct 
buildings so the land is saleable. In reality of course, many plots do exchange hands without 
the requisite percentage of construction having been done, through systems of informal 
brokerage and exchange. However, the new µowner¶ remains in a position of insecurity until 
they have undertaken sufficient construction to be able to officially acquire the deed.68 This 
regulatory framework combines with the lack of savings and investment opportunities to 
encourage people channel resources into buildings, even if they cannot be finished when easy 
finance runs out. The combination of incentives and constraints in place is thus producing 
µVNHOHWRQFLW\VFDSHV¶RIVSHFXODWive and unfinished construction.  
 
6. Concluding reflections: the safest bet? 
µ3XWWLQJXSDEXLOGLQJLVWKHEHVWEHWQRZ«0DQXIDFWXULQJLVWRRULVN\DQGFRPSOLFDWHG
We lack the risk-taking entrepreneurs and it is very hard to compete in the global 
PDUNHW«3XWWLQJ XS D EXLOGLQJ LV ULVN\ EXW LW¶V OHVV ULVN\ WKDQ DQ\WKLQJ HOVH ,W¶V YHU\
PXFKVHHQDVDµVDIHEHW¶¶69 
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As the above quotation from a source in Addis Ababa illustrates, the situation in which late-
developing countries find themselves today is one where competing in manufacturing export 
markets is extremely difficult, and highly skilled service sectors even more so. Appealing 
investment options are few and far between.  In Rwanda, with even fewer raw materials and a 
much smaller market, this is even more acute.70 Such profits as can be made in other 
businesses are seen as best reinvested not in that business or in a bank, but in property. As a 
SURSHUW\RZQHULQ.LJDOLSXWLWµ,I,¶P running a business whose absorption is only $5,000, 
the rest I invest in a risk-IUHHDVVHWKRXVLQJ,WZLOODSSUHFLDWH,W¶VDVDIHEHW«IRUWKRVHZLWK
FDVKWRVSDUHWKH\LQYHVWLQKRXVLQJ,W¶VDOODERXWPDQDJLQJULVN¶71 While the buildings that 
appear through such strategies are not necessarily profitable or even usable in the short term, 
in the medium and long term they are seen as more likely to yield profits than anything else. 
In the absence of disincentives, such investment carries relatively little risk.  
This lack of measures to effectively deter speculation on property is cause for serious 
concern. The development strategies of most African states aim to attract large-scale 
investment into productive sectors and encourage savings, but a situation where major de 
facto tax breaks accrue to real estate may be impeding this by increasing the magnetism of 
construction of (potentially) high-return property. The property tax literature suggests that 
higher taxes on land (as opposed to structures) reduce speculation on land, because they 
incentivize people to build and make the land more profitable, while higher taxes on 
structures discourage development of the land (Bahl and Linn, 1992: 173-4). However, built 
into this analysis is an assumption that the µintensive¶ and µefficient¶ use of land through high 
rise development of any kind is necessarily a positive outcome in any given setting. What this 
ignores is the possibility of speculation not only on land but on the buildings themselves. If, 
as in Addis Ababa, land is very expensive but buildings effectively untaxed, then the 
incentive is to build in the hope that the building will bring profits, and the bigger the 
building the better. Under such conditions, and in the context of rapid economic growth, 
people with resources may be more inclined to speculate on buildings than on land itself. This 
is potentially even more damaging if it results in an oversupply of buildings that does not 
match demand, a reduction in amount of land available of different uses, and the sucking of 
resources away from productive investment.  
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Moreover, once the buildings are there, the city has been fundamentally shaped by them in 
ways that are difficult to reverse. As Lefebvre noted, urbanism becomes a force in its own 
right. The strategies and tactics of people involved in property ± which normalize incremental 
development, cross-financing from other businesses, and the leaving of buildings unfinished 
for long periods of time ± are not irrational given particular land regulations, high inflation, 
constrained finance, absent property taxation and anticipated future economic growth. These 
conditions and behaviours are not adequately accounted for in conventional accounts of 
actors and institutions in the real estate sector, but they are the conditions and behaviours 
shaping many cities today. Situations of late development are thus often also characterised by 
a condition of µlate urbanization¶ which is undertheorized and often overlooked. These 
countries are shaped by urbanization taking place a time when it is very hard to industrialize 
due to the strength of international competition for manufactures, yet economic growth is 
taking place internally, diaspora finance is flowing in in search of high returns, and personnel 
on international salaries are helping to buoy the urban economy. All this combines 
powerfully ZLWKWKHGLIIXVLRQRILGHDVRIµPRGHUQ¶XUEDQODQGVFDSHVEHILWWLQJIXWXUHµJOREDO
FLWLHV¶ to draw capital into the secondary circuit. Such forces can even outweigh concerted 
efforts to get resources into manufacturing industry, as in Ethiopia, especially when bolstered 
by the informal incentives created by failures to tax property and related incomes.  
It is clear that there are important differences between the countries considered here in terms 
of the kinds of real estate that capital is most vigorously flowing into: much more commercial 
property is being developed in Addis and the over-supply of high-end residential property is 
more evident in Kigali. Nevertheless, just as there are generic features of property 
development in advanced capitalist societies that real estate researchers have sought to 
specify VR WRR DUH WKHUH JHQHUDO WUHQGV LQ VLWXDWLRQV RI µODWH XUbanization¶ that these cases 
highlight. Speculative urbanism, rather than the force of past or present industrial 
development, is a major ± arguably the major ± driving force of the urban landscapes 
discussed here. This is clearly not unique to the two countries discussed above. In nearby 
Tanzania, for example, an oversupply of both high-end residential and commercial property 
is now frequently acknowledged,72 yet the building for these chimerical markets continues. 
One property developer spoke of being approached very seriously by a major investor about a 
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real estate project worth $1bn in Dar es Salaam, and when he asked incredulously µZKHUHLV
WKHGHPDQG"¶was met with the response that it might appear, µPD\EHLQWZHQW\\HDUV¶73   
The problems with this mode of urban development are potentially severe on a number of 
levels. A first relates to the gaping disjuncture between what is being built and the needs of 
the majority of the population, particularly with regard to affordable housing. While the 
Ethiopian government has attempted to innovate in this regard with its condominium 
programme, the shortcomings of this scheme in practice are significant. While some low-
income groups can access these units through the lottery system, the monthly payments 
required are still too much of a stretch, such that the dominant tendency is for those who 
acquire them to remain living in a slum while renting the apartment out to middle-income 
groups in order to cover the cost. This is creating new forms of spatial segregation, albeit 
ones that diverge markedly from what ZRXOGEHH[SHFWHGEDVHGRQWKHSURJUDPPH¶Vstated 
intentions. In Kigali, meanwhile, virtually nothing has been done to produce affordable 
KRXVLQJGHVSLWHWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VDZDUHQHVVRIWKHXUJHQF\RIWKHLssue (RoR, 2015b), while 
WKHSURGXFWLRQRIµ9LVLRQ&LW\¶DQGSXUVXLWRIDµPRGHUQ¶VN\OLQHFRQWLQXHVDSDFH, squeezing 
the poor into an ever smaller proportion of urban space. Interestingly, in both cities this 
segregation is not of the highly fortified variety associated with some other African cities, but 
there are reasons to believe that such fortification will not follow long behind when space is 
partitioned in this way (Murray 2011). 
Secondly DV VFKRODUV H[SORULQJ WKH SRWHQWLDO DQG OLPLWV RI WKH µVHFRQGDU\ FLUFXLW¶ KDYH
argued, a fixation on real estate may present problems for long-term capital accumulation 
itself. As Gotham notes, µUHDO HVWDWH LV E\ GH¿QLWLRQ LOOLTXLG VSDWLDOO\ ¿[HG DQG LPPRELOH
relatively durable and costly¶, ZKLOHFDSLWDOLVµabstract, nomadic and placeless¶ this duality 
between immobile properties and mobile capital represents an µinherent contradiction¶ 
(Gotham, 2009: 359). In this view, UHDOHVWDWHFDQLWVHOIµbe a barrier to capital accumulation, 
ZKHQ LWV HQGXULQJ TXDOLWLHV UHQGHU LW RXWGDWHG DQG DQDFKURQLVWLF RU ZKHQ WKH ¿QDQFLQJ
needed to construct, sell, and rHKDELOLWDWH LW LVXQDYDLODEOH¶ *RWKDP, 2009: 359). Although 
writing about the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the global North, this speaks with great 
pertinence to the problems discussed here. Few in either Kigali or Addis doubt that many of 
the residential or commercial properties being erected at huge cost will lie partially or wholly 
unused, with their relevance to future development an open question. Taking up increasing 
proportions of the urban surface in situations where land is under huge pressure, the 
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channelling of resources into these structures results in decreasing space (as well as a 
relatively stagnant industrial base) into which capital can more productively flow. As such, it 
is not only social equity but structural economic transformation itself under threat from these 
cityscapes. The inability of existing theories of urban real estate investment to adequately 
predict and explain these developments provides fertile ground for further theoretical 
reflection and innovation. 
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